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world’s poorest region: Evidence
from Kenya’s road building
Just how significant is ethnic favouritism in Africa? It’s a
common aspect of Africa’s perception and many of the
continents ills have been blamed on it. Yet, it has been quite
difficult to find concrete evidence of this behaviour. So how
much does it actually exist and what are the effects? We look at
the case of Kenya and find strong empirical evidence of ethnic
favouritism but, during periods of democracy, our measures of
favouritism disappear entirely. Africa’s recent improved
economic performance may be due, then, to democracy placing
greater constraints on the executive which in turn limits ethnic
favouritism.
Africa’s growth tragedy has been linked to a very diverse set of
factors; ethnic favouritism – a situation where coethnics receive
a disproportionate share of public resources via patronage and
public policy decisions when members of their ethnic group
control the government purse – has been one factor argued by
historians, political scientists and economists. Easterly and
Levine (1997) attribute much of the poor economic
performance in Africa up to the end of the 1980s as due to
political frictions and economic mismanagement associated
with ethnic fractionalisation. Several accounts (e.g. Bates 1983,
Horowitz 1985, Esman 1994, Mamdani 1996) argue that
ethnic favouritism ultimately emerges because weak political
institutions are unable to constrain governments from
discriminating among citizens. Therefore, to understand the
recent political and economic performance of many African
countries (growth rate per capita has been positive since the
1990s, after nearly three decades of negative growth, see Fig 1),
we have an opportunity to determine to whether ethnic
favouritism’s prevalence, and whether the emergence (or in
many cases, re-emergence) of democracy has helped mitigate it.
Africa is indeed becoming more democratic (see Fig 1).[1]
Between the early 1960s, when many African countries gained
independence from their colonial ruler, and the end of the Cold
War in 1991, not a single African ruler was peacefully
succeeded at the ballot box, except in Mauritius. But since
Benin’s Mathieu Kérékou and Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda
bequeathed power graciously in 1991, more than 30 African
leaders or ruling parties have let their voters decide. Multiparty
systems in Africa now far outnumber single-party ones. This
contrasts strikingly with the Arab world, where so far almost
no incumbent-ejecting elections have taken place anywhere.
FIGURE.1
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FIGURE.1
In a recent paper (Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria and Padro
i Miquel (2013)), we revisit history and try to credibly quantify
the extent of ethnic favouritism in Kenya’s public expenditure,
for the post-independence period and we also examine whether
the transition into and out of a multiparty democracy affects
ethnic favouritism.
In Kenya, a particular group due to colonial era border
delineation dominates most districts and the geographic pattern
on ethnic demographics has remained stable over time. This
means we can assess directly, using road outcomes by district,
whether or not ethnic groups that shared the ethnicity of the
president benefitted disproportionately from roads. The benefit
of this is that road expenditure and road construction data can
be directly measured over long periods of time, as we did for all
41 Kenyan districts from independence to 2011. Not only is
road expenditure the largest single element of public
expenditure (15% — three times expenditure on health,
education or water) but it is centrally allocated and is a highly
visible form of public investment and hence a prime target for
ethnic favouritism.
Kenya’s political history provides us with an ideal laboratory to
investigate political institutional changes within a leadership.
Switches in the ethnicity of the president, and switches into and
out of multiparty democracy under the same president are
illustrated in Figure 2:
Looking at Figure 3, our results can be illustrated across key
years in Kenya’s political history. The pink area represents the
six Kalenjin dominant districts (11% national population),
while the green area represents seven Kikuyu dominant districts
(20% national population). Comparison of the road maps for
1979 and 1992 gives a first visual indication of ethnic
favouritism. The paved road network in and around the green
Kikuyu districts appears largely frozen between these two years.
In contrast the paved road network in and around the pink
Kalenjin areas expands dramatically. After 1992, in conversely,
the expansion in and around the green and pink areas is much
more equal.
Figure 3
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By looking at whether a district receives road spending that is
exactly proportional to its population, we can calculate a
measure of favouritism. Taking those districts with evidence of
favouritism, we can see if the majority of the people in that
district share the same ethnicity of the president.
If you look in figure 4a, the grey, straight line represents what
an exactly population proportional allocation of resources
should yield, but clearly ethnic groups with a majority having
the same ethnicity of the president (the red line) receive a larger
share of road funding than those districts of a majority with a
different ethnicity to that of the president (the blue line). What
is really striking is that during multiparty democracy (1960s,
1990s and 2000s) the ratio is consistently lower and tends to be
near one on average for both types of districts, implying little
ethnic favouritism. Note that this pattern is observed within
leadership.
Figure 4a
Figure 4b repeats the above exercise, but this time further
disaggregates the coethnic districts into Kikuyu and Kalenjn
districts includes to display that our results are not driven by a
particular ethnic group in power.
Figure 4b
The results are telling – Kikuyu districts receive road spending
in line with their population share during the democratic years.
Following the banning of opposition political parties in 1969,
road spending concentrates in these districts and rises to twice
22/06/2017 The value of democracy in the world's poorest region: Evidence from Kenya's road building - IGC
http://www.theigc.org/blog/the-value-of-democracy-in-the-worlds-poorest-region-evidence-from-kenyas-road-building/ 4/5
road spending concentrates in these districts and rises to twice
their population share until the death of Kenyatta (1978). After
which we see a meteoric rise in Kalenjin districts allocation, and
at the same time a decline in Kikuyu districts’ allocation.
Kalenjin districts continue to obtain above their population’s
share until the re-introduction of multiparty democracy (1992).
After which we see a diminished effect on coethnic districts but
a revival of the other districts – in fact, for the other districts,
those that never had a coethnic president we observe a U-
shaped pattern in their allocation. Democracy seems to have a
levelling influence in ensuring that Kenyan districts receive
roads resources roughly in line with their population share
irrespective of their ethnic alignment with the president. The
stark pattern in the road investments we observe in presidential
coethnic districts as Kenya enters and exits autocracy is
extremely difficult to reconcile with spending being driven by
economic efficiency.
Across the 1963 to 2011 period, Kenyan districts that share the
ethnicity of the president received twice as much expenditure on
roads. This is unequivocal evidence of an extreme degree of
ethnic favouritism. However, these biases are not constant.
While in periods of autocracy, coethnic districts receive three
times the average expenditure in roads and five times the length
of paved roads, both these biases disappear entirely during
periods of democracy. The political regime, then, is an
important determinant of ethnic favouritism.
As Kenya’s history shows us, multiparty democracy (which re-
emerged in the 1990s) changed the nature of constraints on
leaders and altered the allocation of public resources. The
increase in mass political participation under democracy meant
citizens were better able to express themselves and allowed for
far greater scrutiny of executive authorities – this could
potentially explain why ethnic favouritism reduced during
periods of multiparty democracy. Despite slow progress Africa
is becoming more democratic, with almost all countries now
holding proper elections, growth should benefit from greater
public scrutiny but, ultimately, it will be up to Africans to
demand representative governments, a challenge given half its
population is on $1.25 per day.
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Footnotes
[1] Democracy is measured by the Polity IV measure compiled
by political scientist at University of Maryland. Polity IV defines
three regime categories: autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to
+5) and democracies (+6 to +10). See
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
